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Abstract. The ever rising rates of data generation entail new opportunities for 
business and society but also an increasing risk of data breaches. Apart from 
technical measures, approaches like password authentication to ensure data 
protection revolve around the end-user as the human element in information 
security. Drawing on organizational research which argues that the sole feeling 
of ownership towards an intangible target like data can lead to heightened levels 
of the individual’s responsibility, we investigate whether and to what extent this 
ownership feeling differs between personal files and data accessed in the work 
context. To this end, we draw on data derived through a two-phase questionnaire 
among a representative group of 209 employees. Consequently, we find evidence 
that psychological ownership shows stronger effects on protection motivation 
among participants in a private context. Furthermore, results indicate that 
employees partly relinquish their responsibility regarding security responses to 
protect data in their work context. 
Keywords: password security, psychological ownership, employee, home user, 
protection motivation theory  
1 Introduction 
According to the latest estimations in 2012, 2.7 million terabytes existed in the digital 
universe with roughly 35 zettabytes of data generated annually by 2020 [1]. Data 
generation is further fueled through the acceleration of the Internet of Things and the 
growth of worldwide internet users to 4 billion in 2018 [2].  
Unsurprisingly, the age of big data promises new opportunities for business and 
everyday life but entails new flip sides as evidenced by the ever increasing frequency 
and amount of damage of data breaches committed by cyber criminals. Verizon’s 
annual report estimates that 81 percent of data breaches that occurred since 2014 were 
caused by stolen or weak passwords [3]. An estimation particularly striking given that 
the most prevalent approach to both access and protect private and business data 
remains through password authentication. Passwords can thus be considered a 
particular vulnerability as they are especially intertwined with the human element in 
information systems – the end-user. Since end-users have been continuously identified 
1277
as the “weakest link” within the security chain, behavioral information security research 
emerged as an important subfield of information systems (IS) [4, 5]. 
Research on human behavior in IS security has been drawing on psychology, 
criminology, or health science and various adapted frameworks and models have been 
applied within the end-user context, examining either employee or individual private 
user behavior [5-7]. These models show that factors such as the certainty of sanctions, 
the risk appraisal of a cyber threat or perceived behavioral control are strong indicators 
leading to the behavioral intention to perform certain protective actions [8, 9]. 
However, extant studies have only identified and analyzed the effectiveness of these 
factors on security in either a work environment or in the context of private use [10]. 
Thus, it remains unclear if certain factors affect the intention to behave in a more secure 
way in order to protect – one’s own or the company’s – data even though the context-
sensitivity of findings has recently received increased attention among IS scholars [11]. 
In this regard, existing studies [e.g., 12, 13] have suggested that the sole feeling of 
possession or “being psychologically tied to an object” [14, p. 299] might lead to 
heightened levels of individual responsibility and engagement in IS security behavior. 
This feeling is referred to as “psychological ownership”, a concept that describes the 
self-derived perception of ownership opposed to the actual legal ownership which is 
backed by the perception of others and the legal system. Psychological ownership (PO) 
is rooted within the innate human need to experience possession of either tangible or 
intangible targets [15] and the sense of regarding this target as extension of one’s self 
[16]. In turn, human desire to experience control and accountability over the target 
differs according to the level of PO an individual experiences [14, 17]. 
However, IS studies thus far have either focused on feelings of ownership towards 
the targets ‘internet’ and ‘one’s computer’ among home-users [12] or towards the target 
‘information’ in a generic work-based scenario [13]. Whereas the first study argues for 
a direct influence of PO on intention to protect the target of ownership, the latter 
theorizes how PO affects the protection motivation, i.e., antecedents of intention to 
protect information. Due to the dearth of research on the influence of PO on security 
behavior, both aforementioned studies call for future research with Anderson and 
Agarwal specifically recommending additional studies that “explore the differences in 
behavior between employees and home users” [12, p. A15]. Nevertheless, other IS 
studies that integrated PO into the privacy calculus [18] or explored PO of IT [19] have 
only examined the role of PO in one single context and have not questioned yet how 
levels of PO might differ according to situational differences in contexts. But do 
individuals really experience the same degree of PO regarding, for example, their own 
electronic device or one provided through their company? Or do individuals experience 
higher levels of PO regarding their personal data as opposed to PO regarding the data 
they work with – and are supposed to protect through appropriate security measures – 
in their professional environment? 
Against this backdrop, we seek to (1) extend prior IS research on individuals’ 
protection motivation of data by highlighting the distinct role of PO both in a work and 
a private context. Furthermore, our study is the first to our knowledge that actually (2) 
compares protection motivation based on a repeated measures study design and one 
distinct sample in both contexts. 
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The remainder of this article is structured as follows: the theoretical background of 
both Protection Motivation Theory and psychological ownership is presented and 
serves as the foundation of our hypotheses which are integrated into a research model 
and tested in both a work and private setting. Subsequently, the results of our study are 
demonstrated and discussed before implications for theory and practice are derived. 
2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 
The following section provides an overview of the current state of behavioral IS 
security research in both work and private contexts along with the basics of the 
aforementioned concept of psychological ownership and how it has been accounted for 
thus far in IS security literature. Based on the theoretical background, hypotheses are 
developed and integrated into our research model which draws on Protection 
Motivation Theory (PMT). 
 
2.1 Information Security Research 
IS research has a long-standing tradition of analyzing security-related issues on an 
organizational and individual level [20, 21]. In an organizational context, researchers 
continue to advance technical approaches to prevent intrusion or to detect attacks [22, 
23], however behavioral information security research has gained considerable 
momentum during the last two decades by focusing on human, and in particular, end-
user behavior in work and private use contexts. 
Within behavioral information security research, users in a work context can 
generally be divided into two subgroups: users that exhibit deviant behavior, i.e., 
compromising information security through espionage, theft, or sabotage, and those 
users who misbehave without the intent to cause damage [24]. By means of example, 
the latter group’s misbehavior can manifest itself through defiance of security policy 
aspects such as using corporate devices to access non-work related websites or utilizing 
weak, repetitive and thus easy-to-compromise passwords for important work accounts 
[25]. In order to understand the driving factors of such “unintended” misbehavior or to 
identify aspects that encourage the use of safeguarding practices, IS researchers have 
heavily relied on behavioral theories that originate in behavioral psychology, 
organizational science, criminology, or health research [6-9, 12]. 
Protection Motivation Theory has been widely used to analyze “any threat for which 
there is an effective recommended response that can be carried out by the individual” 
[26, p. 409] and thus serves as a widespread theory in IS security research due to its 
applicability to security threats such as violating security compliances [27] or losing 
data due to irregular backups or weak passwords [28]. At the core of PMT, attitudes of 
individuals are assessed through two cognitive processes which lead to an increased 
intention to protect oneself against a potential threat: namely, threat and coping 
appraisal. 
Threat appraisal comprises the perception and assessment of threat severity as well 
as the personal vulnerability to a threat. In our security context, perceived severity of a 
data breach and one’s own vulnerability to fall prey to such an event will affect the 
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protection motivation regarding data. As both perceived severity and vulnerability are 
positively correlated with the response behavior to protect one’s data, which in our case 
will be through strong passwords, we hypothesize: 
 
H1a Perceived vulnerability will have a positive effect on an end-user’s intention to 
protect (work and private) data. 
H1b Perceived severity will have a positive effect on an end-user’s intention to 
protect (work and private) data. 
 
Once the threat is assessed, e.g., the potential severity of data loss or theft and one’s 
susceptibility or likeliness to experience such an incident, individuals will evaluate a 
potential behavioral response to the threat during the so-called coping appraisal. 
Coping appraisal includes the concepts response efficacy and the associated 
response costs of the planned coping response necessary to protect oneself from the 
specific threat, as well as one’s perceived self-efficacy in performing the response. If 
self-efficacy and response efficacy outweigh response costs, an individual yields a 
positive coping appraisal, i.e., individuals will install anti-virus software despite the 
associated costs in terms of purchase price or time to install because they feel capable 
of performing the installation and also deem the software to be effective in averting 
viruses and malware [12, 28]. More precisely, response efficacy in PMT refers to the 
belief that a certain response performed by the individual actually leads to a reduction 
or elimination of the considered threat. 
Regarding IS security, end-users might wonder if strong passwords actually increase 
the security of their own or their company’s data. If this specific response is considered 
effective in actually decreasing the threat (such as potential misuse of data caused by 
unauthorized access) an individual will be more inclined towards actually using strong 
passwords. However, this response also entails the cognitive effort of remembering 
several complex passwords. The concept of response costs thus assesses all efforts and 
expenditures associated with the coping behavior which will have a negative impact on 
the intention of actually performing the response in question. We thus hypothesize: 
 
H1c Response efficacy will have a positive effect on an end-user’s intention to 
protect (work and private) data. 
H1d Response costs will have a negative effect on an end-user’s intention to protect 
(work and private) data. 
 
The core nomology of PMT additionally includes the concept of self-efficacy which 
has also been applied in various other theories to assess IS security behavior, often as 
part of the construct perceived behavioral control (PBC) [8, 29, 30]. On the one hand, 
self-efficacy relates to the confidence of individuals in their own skill, knowledge and 
ability to perform the response. On the other hand, controllability, as the second aspect 
of PBC, describes how much of the performance is actually up to the individual [30, 
31]. One example would be that employees might be hindered to implement a security 
measure due to missing administrator rights on their work computers. Similar to other 
PMT-based studies which extended their research model with elements of the models 
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originating from Theory of Planned Behavior, we also integrate the complete concept 
of PBC into our model as it could serve as a differentiator between the work and private 
context [12, 32]. 
In an IS security context, end-users who are confident in their ability to perform an 
appropriate security measure like backing up data at home or at their workplace, will 
be more inclined to progress with that chosen coping mechanism. However, 
controllability might differ across contexts, because employees might not express the 
same extent of assumed controllability regarding their actions if they cannot implement 
a security measure due to missing administrator rights – even if they had the skill and 
knowledge in doing so. As a result, they might shift the responsibility to their IT 
department or employer. Nevertheless, if employees just like private end-user ascribe 
responsibility to themselves, i.e., perceive higher degrees of controllability regarding 
the coping mechanism, they will be more proactive in taking appropriate security 
measures [32]. Hence, we expect that: 
 
H1e Self-efficacy will have a positive effect on an end-user’s intention to protect 
(work and private) data. 
H1f Controllability will have a positive effect on an end-user’s intention to protect 
(work and private) data. 
2.2 Psychological Ownership 
The following examples serve as an introduction to the general concept of PO: 1) Alice 
and Bob, both three-year-old toddlers, erupt in a fight over a doll in a physician’s 
practice: both children claim the doll belongs to them and attempt to protect it from the 
other claimant by shouting “It is MINE!” – Although, technically, the doll is legally 
owned by the physician. 2) Alice’s mother is a project manager. She lovingly calls one 
of her recent projects her ‘baby’ and takes many project-related tasks home to continue 
working after hours instead of delegating tasks because she feels a high sense of 
commitment and ownership towards this particular project. These scenarios depict how 
individuals behave when they feel that they possess an ownership stake in a physical or 
intangible object – a phenomenon called psychological ownership. 
The term PO stems from psychology and describes the sense of ownership of a target 
like the aforementioned doll or project, but can also be felt towards a concept, another 
person, or an entire organization or community. The target is seen as an extension of 
the self [33], i.e., the owners regard the target as an expression of themselves or feel a 
strong sense of belongingness towards the target – as evidenced for example by football 
supporters who feel strong ownership towards their football club [14, 16]. Although 
related, PO is distinct from legal ownership which is recognized by society and 
protected by legislation – whereas PO is a “condition of which one is aware through 
intellectual perception […] coupled with an emotional or affective sensation” 
[34, p. 86]. The resulting effects of PO have been analyzed and categorized into 
positive outcomes – such as citizenship, personal sacrifice and assumption of risk, or 
experienced responsibility and stewardship – and negative effects like territoriality and 
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other defiant behavior, or personal maladies like stress or frustration if the target is 
subject to any form of alteration [34, 36]. 
The roots of PO or the reason why this cognitive-affective state exists is best 
explained by an innate need of having a place or belongingness to the target [15], a 
sense of symbolic expression though the target or self-identity [16], and the desire to 
experience causal efficacy through control and accountability over the target [14, 17]. 
Due to the versatility of the PO concept, it has found extensive application especially 
in management and organizational research. More recently, studies in an IS context 
have started to introduce PO and demonstrated its impact on system usage and 
appreciation of IT [19, 35], willingness to disclose data [18], or intentions to perform 
security-related behavior [12, 13]. However, only the latter two studies examine the 
role of PO as antecedent of the threat and coping appraisal or its direct effect on 
intention in a behavioral security context [12,13]. In line with their reasoning and to 
further explicate how PO possibly affects the coping and threat appraisal, we present a 
third example: 3) Bob’s father uses a CRM application on a daily basis at work which 
is accessed through password authentication. He is fully aware of the criticality of 
customer and business data stored in the application and has an intimate knowledge of 
many entries since he found and recorded a lot of the information himself. The data is 
not simply his company’s data but also his own in his perception and a loss thereof 
would hurt him personally. Thus, threats to the target can be regarded as threats to 
oneself because the target represents an extension of one’s self-concept or identity. In 
our context, higher levels of PO will lead to heightened perceptions of severity and 
vulnerability when faced with the prospect of losing one’s data. This will more likely 
occur in the context of private data as opposed to data in a work context. Hence, we 
assume that risk appraisal will be influenced through psychological ownership as 
follows: 
 
H2a PO of (work and private) data will increase perceptions of threat vulnerability. 
This effect will be more pronounced in a private context. 
H2b PO of (work and private) data will increase perceptions of threat severity. This 
effect will be more pronounced in a private context.  
 
Intimate knowledge or a deep understanding and familiarity of an object will lead to 
higher degrees of association with the object [37]. This is evidenced by individuals’ 
statements of preferring own targets to comparable others, simply because one knows 
them better, e.g., the favorite spot in the canteen. Acquiring knowledge about a target 
is also linked to investment of the self into the target which represents the third route to 
PO. Investing time, effort, or energy into the creation or development of a target, e.g., 
in a mentor-mentee relationship or into do-it-yourself-projects, facilitates feelings of 
PO by seeing one’s own reflection in the target [34]. In organizational studies, 
employees who feel PO toward their company are shown to express higher levels of 
organizational commitment, organizational-based self-esteem, and job performance 
[36, 38, 39]. Subsequently, Pierce and colleagues argue that pronounced feelings of PO 
will influence the degree of its effects – both positive and negative [38]. In line with 
Menard and colleagues, we also expect that PO will exert influence on the coping 
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appraisal considering the use of diverse and strong passwords in both the private and 
work context [13], and thus hypothesize: 
 
H2c PO of (work and private) data will increase perceptions of response efficacy. 
This effect will be more pronounced in a private context.  
H2d PO of (work and private) data will decrease perceptions of response costs. This 
effect will be more pronounced in a private context.  
 
Apart from intimate knowledge of the target, and investment of the self, Pierce and 
colleagues also argue that perceived control is closely tied to feelings of PO [14]. 
Numerous studies prove that control is a core feature of ownership as objects that are 
habitually used or can even be manipulated by an individual become more assimilated 
into the user’s self-concept [17]. According to Avey and colleagues, individuals will be 
“feeling more efficacious about working with the target, feeling more accountable for 
what happens with respect to the target” [39, p. 24] when they feel psychologically tied 
to the target. In our context, PO regarding their data will thus facilitate feelings of 
responsibility and as a result lead to heightened levels of willingness and confidence in 
their ability to carry out a protective response against the IS security threat [40].  
 
H2e PO of (work and private) data will increase perceptions of self-efficacy. This 
effect will be more pronounced in a private context.  
H2f PO of (work and private) data will increase perceptions of controllability. This 
effect will be more pronounced in a private context.   
3 Research Model and Methodology 
Our research model draws primarily on the approach of Menard and colleagues [12] 
which examines how psychological ownership affects the protection motivation based 
on PMT. We further extend the model with the additional construct of controllability 
in order to include and examine another important but yet often overlooked aspect of 
perceived behavioral control. In both contexts, we examine how the behavioral 
intention to use strong passwords in order to protect data is influenced by both the 
classic determinants of PMT and how these are in turn influenced by PO in our two 
contexts. 
3.1 Data Collection Procedure 
In order to investigate our research questions, we conducted an online survey among 
employees in Germany who use electronic devices to access software applications or 
websites and are interacting with company data in their professional environment on an 
everyday basis. Since comparing work and private contexts involves repeated measures 
for our research model, certain biases have to be considered and countered. In order to 
avoid that participants remember their answers from the first context (i.e., work) and 
aspire to repeat the same answer in the second context (i.e., private) to ensure self-
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consistency [42], we decided not to survey both contexts (work vs. private) in one single 
questionnaire. Furthermore, we chose to survey the same panel of respondents (cohorts) 
for both contexts. This enables us to investigate differences in an individual’s 
perception handling work-related data as well as private data. 
As threat scenario we chose the misuse of data caused by insecure passwords. 
Consequently, the coping strategy depicted the usage of strong passwords which are 
distinct between different user accounts. Both questionnaires were distributed online in 
August 2018 in two waves with the help of a market research institute. Seven days upon 
completion, the same cohort was invited to participate in a second survey assessing 
their password behavior within their private context. This timespan was chosen in order 
to avoid manipulating risk appraisal and coping appraisal between both conditions 
through unforeseen incidents or factors (work vs. private context) and is comparable to 
other IS studies using a repeated measures design [41, 42]. Using an even longer time-
span entails the risk of external influences (security incidents and other message cues) 
to bias the respondents’ perceptions compared to the first wave. Both surveys 
commenced with a welcome page which ensured the participants’ anonymity and that 
there are no “wrong” answers in order to counteract common method and social 
desirability biases [13,43]. 
Only those participants who completed both survey questionnaires were included in 
the data analyses (N = 217). Since eight participants failed our attention check during 
the second wave, their answers were deemed unreliable resulting in a final sample size 
of 209. The effective response rate after the second wave – and the elimination of 
unreliable responses and attention checks – amounted to 70.37 percent, an acceptable 
rate for questionnaires considering security-related behavior [e.g., 28, 44]. 
The sample was evenly distributed in terms of gender (51.2 % female; 48.8 % male) 
and age (mean = 44.9; min = 19; max = 65) through quotas mirroring the percentage of 
the overall population in Germany and thus providing an adequate snapshot of reality 
of German employees. We report a more detailed sample statistic in the online appendix 
(Table A1). 
3.2 Operationalization of Research Variables and Instruments 
All measurements to operationalize our research variables are based on previously 
validated operationalization and have been adapted to the context of our study as we 
report in the online appendix (Table A2). The items for all threat related PMT constructs 
(vulnerability [VULN], severity [SEV]) were adopted from Johnston and Warkentin 
[45]. Items for response efficacy [RE] have been extracted from Witte [46] whereas 
response costs [RC] as well as self-efficacy [SE] were adapted from Milne at al. [41]. 
Controllability [CON] was measured using the scale from Kraft and colleagues [47]. 
Our dependent variable behavioral intention [INT] has been operationalized using items 
from Herath and Rao [25] whereas psychological ownership [PO] has been adopted 
from van Dyne and Pierce [38].  
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4 Data Analysis and Results 
Our data set contains 209 responses for each context based on the same respondent 
cohort. Therefore, we distinguish between two contexts: the work versus the private 
context. In the following, the hypothesized relationships between variables are analyzed 
relying on the PLS algorithm as implemented in SmartPLS in order to simultaneously 
validate the measurement model and the conceptual path model [48]. 
 
Measurement Model Testing. We begin by assessing convergent validity of all our 
variables for each condition (work and private). Internal consistency can be assumed 
for constructs if Cronbach’s alpha (Cr α) as well as composite reliability (CR) are at 
least 0.7 [49]. To establish convergent validity, the average variance extracted (AVE) 
should exceed 0.5 [50]. In addition, item loadings are assessed against a threshold of 
0.65 or higher [51]. We find minimum loadings of 0.707 / 0.840 in the work and private 
context respectively. Therefore, we conclude that convergent validity is ensured. 
Table 1. Measurement Model Validation 
  Work Context 
  Cr α CR AVE CON INT PO RE RC SE SEV VULN 
CON .915 .937 .790 .889               
INT .948 .967 .906 .383 .952             
PO .906 .941 .843 .167 .095 .918           
RC .940 .957 .848 .252 .403 -.054 .896         
RE .879 .924 .803 -.248 -.399 -.047 -.223 .921       
SE .854 .912 .775 .236 .469 .015 .387 -.662 .880     
SEV .927 .948 .821 .273 .355 .060 .361 -.126 .315 .906   
VULN .794 .859 .606 .004 .001 .192 -.061 .237 -.116 .102 .778 
  Private Context 
  Cr α CR AVE CON INT PO RE RC SE SEV VULN 
CON .937 .954 .840 .916               
INT .930 .955 .876 .366 .936             
PO .888 .931 .818 .437 .297 .904           
RC .949 .963 .867 .582 .364 .446 .898         
RE .881 .926 .807 -.354 -.446 -.199 -.070 .931       
SE .881 .927 .810 .399 .514 .333 .189 -.746 .900     
SEV .929 .950 .825 .252 .260 .306 .364 -.080 .137 .909   
VULN .898 .928 .762 -.235 -.102 -.067 -.171 .356 -.209 .095 .873 
 
For acceptable discriminant validity, we rely on the criteria suggested by Fornell and 
Larcker [52]. Accordingly, the square-root of AVE (bold numbers in Table 1) needs to 
be greater than the correlations to all other constructs. Since this holds true for all 
constructs within both conditions, we assume our measurement model to be accurate as 
further evidenced by cross loadings reported in the online appendix (Table A3). 
 
Structural Model Testing. Continuing with the validated measurement model, we 
assess the overall model fit of our conceptual models. The standardized root mean 
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square residual (SRMR) is 0.066 resp. 0.046 (work resp. private) which is well below 
the cutoff-point of 0.08 recommended by Hu and Bentler, indicating a good model 
fit [53]. The amount of variance explained within our dependent variables (R2) are 
presented in Figure 1. We use a bootstrapping procedure with 5,000 subsamples to test 
for statistical significance of path coefficient estimates which results are also reported. 
 
Figure 1. Results of the PLS Model Estimation 
 
Work context. In the work context, all hypotheses based on PMT (H1c, d, e, f) except 
for risk perception, i.e., perceived vulnerability and severity, are supported. 
Furthermore, psychological ownership of data shows only significant influences on the 
variables perceived vulnerability (H2a) and controllability (H2f). 
 
Private context. The results show that risk perception has no significant influence on 
behavioral intention to use strong passwords in the private context. Nevertheless, 
response efficacy, response costs and self-efficacy significantly influence behavioral 
intention to use strong passwords and thus support H1c, d, e. The expected effect of 
controllability on behavioral intention is not supported. However, PO has a strong 
influence on the majority of PMT related constructs (H2b, c, d, e, f supported) whereas 
the effect on perceived vulnerability could not be supported in the private context (H2a 
rejected). 
 
Multi Group Analysis. As an extended analysis of the differences between the two 
contexts, we conducted a multi group analysis. Due to space limitations we report 
hypotheses which ultimately show significant differences in their path-coefficients only 
in our online appendix (Table A4). Hereby, the context shows a mediating effect on 
H1f and H2a as the effects are stronger in the work context compared to the private 
context. The context furthermore mediates all other relations from psychological 
ownership. Hence, the effect of psychological ownership is stronger in the private 
context compared to the work context for H2b, c, d, e, f. 
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5 Discussion and Contributions 
With this study, we contribute to a better understanding of PMT according to the 
situational context and via an extension through PO. By using a repeated measures 
design, we are able to demonstrate varying mechanisms leading to the intention to 
protect either private or work data through strong passwords. Specifically, our results 
demonstrate that risk appraisal through perceived severity and vulnerability does not 
significantly affect the intention to use a security measures such as strong passwords 
which is in line with some recent findings of other researchers [8, 13]. 
Furthermore, we find significant differences regarding the effect of controllability 
across contexts: whereas a significant effect of controllability on the intention to use 
strong passwords indicates that employees feel accountable for their choice, this effect 
could not be shown among private end-users. This might indicate that they do not even 
perceive an opportunity to shift control, and thus accountability, to some third party 
such as the employer. Therefore, we find evidence that individuals in the private context 
are aware of their sole accountability when responding to security threats. Otherwise, 
we found the influence of coping appraisal to be generally stronger in a private context. 
Similarly, but opposed to the study of Menard and colleagues, we could demonstrate 
lesser and mostly insignificant effects of PO on PMT antecedents in a work context 
[13]. PO effects are mostly only significant in a private context apart from the 
hypothesized influence on perceived vulnerability – which, in turn, is only evident in a 
work context – and with controllability which is significant in both contexts. 
Additionally, a post-hoc performed paired t-test (t(208) = -20.36; p < 0.001) of PO 
according to the condition work (M = 3.07; SD = 2.77) or private context 
(M = 5.89; SD = 1.34) showed significant differences. Accordingly, we can subsume 
that PO is more pronounced considering the protection of private data and, as 
individuals tend to evaluate a target more favorably when they own it, feelings of 
accountability, responsibility, and investment of the self in the target are stronger [34, 
38, 39]. This leads to several potential implications for both theory and practice. 
 
Theoretical Contributions. From a research point of view, our approach is the first to 
our knowledge that is based on a repeated measures design which enables the 
comparison of PMT’s explanatory power in a work and private context based on the 
same safeguarding behavior, i.e., the use of strong passwords. Our study contributes to 
an improved understanding of the relationships within the theory and shows varying 
support of the general concepts of risk and coping appraisal. Risk perception in isolation 
does not promote safeguarding measures in any context, whereas the inclusion of 
controllability could contribute to more thorough understanding of employee intention 
regarding the use of strong passwords. Additionally, our findings contribute to the still 
scarce literature on psychological ownership in IS security. IS research and studies on 
information security in particular, have incorporated PO very rarely and diversely in 
terms of context and the mode of influence which calls for replication studies as called 
for by Menard et al. or Anderson and Agarwal [12, 13]. In this regard, we could 
demonstrate that PO significantly influences several PMT antecedents only in a private 
context and barely affects the protection motivation among employees.  
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Practical Implications. As such, our study informs IS scholars but also practitioners 
about how a sense of ownership can regulate protection motivation and thus lead to the 
actual use of safeguarding mechanisms like strong passwords. Practitioners in 
particular should stimulate feelings of PO regarding company data in order to increase 
protection motivation. PO can, for example, be increased and stimulated by tapping 
into its antecedents, e.g., through more intimate knowledge of the target, in our case 
data. Also if employees invest more time and effort into understanding how data can 
be protected, employees will develop a feeling of freedom of choice and more 
accountability which in turn increases PO and thus exert a positive effect on 
safeguarding mechanisms [19]. 
6 Conclusion, Limitations, and Future Research 
Despite taking all necessary measures to ensure qualitative results, our study is not 
without limitations. In this regard, a typical limitation of behavioral IS theories is the 
measurement of intention rather than actual behavior. Although intention is widely 
regarded to be a very robust predictor of actual behavior [29, 54], future research could 
build onto our findings with an experimental design that observes the influence of PO 
on actual behavior. Similarly, previous research has identified several other influencing 
factors like culture or personal characteristics which had to be omitted due to duration 
constrains but could enhance our understanding about the modes of action of PO in an 
organizational and individual security context. Especially, since culture has been shown 
to have an effect of the level of PO expressed, our results could be culturally constrained 
to Western, more individualistic, cultures [13]. From a methodological point of view, 
the rather short timeframe of our two surveys might add to the general finding that 
humans strive for a consistent manner of self-representation which might result in 
memory effects or so-called experimenter demand effects [42, 43]. However, an 
extension of the time frame might be affected by unidentifiable external influences due 
to unforeseen incidents or other biases that arise during the survey period. 
An avenue for future research could be the analysis of PO antecedents through an 
action research design measuring whether increased feelings of PO also lead to 
improved actual security behavior in both a work and a private context. Our study thus 
serves as an important stepping stone which first compared the behavior of individuals 
in these contexts in a repeated measures design revealing varying degrees of effect sizes 
in well-established PMT and newly hypothesized PO relationships. Furthermore, future 
research could develop a new operationalization of PO for the IS context, as current 
measures are often based on physical, tangible targets. A different approach could be 
the use of an Implicit Association Test which can detect underlying attitudes of users 
or consumers particularly when subjects are unaware or unwilling to identify sources 
of influence – like PO in our context [55]. This could prove to be particularly interesting 
since an additional estimated PLS model including a path from PO to intention showed 
that no direct influence on intention was found in both contexts as opposed to the 
previous studies. This could be related to the differences in targets as one’s own device 
might elicit more pronounced feelings of PO compared to intangible data or the 
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operationalization of PO through scenario manipulation and represents another possible 
avenue for future research [11]. 
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